Abstract. We study two ways how modular ontologies support privacy preserving query answering.
Introduction
Recently, big effort has been made to understand modules in the context of ontologies and description logic. The problems studied in that context are to find formalisms for combining OWL ontologies as well as methods for decomposing ontologies. These issues mainly are investigated in order to enable safe ontology reuse and to obtain better reasoning algorithms.
We believe that there is another important application of ontology modularization, namely data privacy for ontologies. If we are given a modular ontology, then it should be possible to publish a module while keeping information of another module private. We show how concepts of modular ontologies, such as locality and partitioning, naturally lead to privacy preserving modules.
The privacy notion we study is provable data privacy which has been introduced in the context of relational database systems [1] . This notion has later been extended to logic based systems in [2] . Assume we are given a set of axioms T (which can be seen as general public background knowledge, the database schema, or an ontology) and a public view definition V . A view V I is possible if it may be the answer an agent obtains when issuing the queries of V . We say privacy is preserved for a query C if for no possible view V I the agent can infer from T and V I that an individual a belongs to the answer of C. In database systems this is formalized as the set of certain answers to C is empty with respect to T and V I . For logic based systems this is equivalent to saying that T and V I do not entail a : C for any a.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the expressive description logic SHOIQ for which we will state our privacy results. Further we recall the definitions of provable data privacy in the context of description logic. In Section 3, we present a first privacy result which is based in the notion of locality. Intuitively, a concept C is local with respect to a signature S if we can interpret C by the empty set no matter how S is interpreted. This leads immediately to a privacy result since having an interpretation I where C I is empty means that a : C cannot be inferred for any a. Then in Section 4 we investigate data privacy based on partitioning of ontologies. This allows us to include in the public view definition other queries than in the locality based approach. Finally we discuss related work and conclude.
Technical Preliminaries
In the first part of this section we introduce the description logic SHOIQ, see [3] , which underlies modern ontology languages such as OWL. In the second part we recall the notion of provable data privacy from [1] .
A SHOIQ signature S is the disjoint union of a set of role names R, a set of concept names C, and a set of nominals I. A SHOIQ role is either R ∈ R or an inverse role R − for R ∈ R. The set of SHOIQ concepts C is given by the following grammar C :== A | j | ¬C | C C | ∃R.C | ≥ nS.C where A ∈ C, j ∈ I, and R, S are roles where S is a simple role 1 , and n is a positive integer. We use the abbreviations: C D := ¬(¬C ¬D), ∀R.C := ¬∃R.¬C, and ≤ nS.C := ¬(≥ n + 1S.C).
A SHOIQ TBox is a finite set of role inclusion axioms R 1 R 2 where R i are roles, transitivity axioms trans(R) where R ∈ R, and general concept inclusion axioms C 1 C 2 where C i are concepts. The signature sig(T ) of a TBox T is the set of symbols occurring in T . Similarly, we define the signature of an axiom and of a concept, respectively.
An interpretation I for the signature S is a par (∆ I , · I ) where ∆ I is a nonempty set (called the domain) and · I is the interpretation function such that
and j I is a singleton subset of ∆ I for each j ∈ I. The interpretation function extends to complex roles by (R − ) I := {(y, x) : R I (x, y)} and to concepts by:
We say
An interpretation I is a model of a TBox T (I |= T ) iff it is a model of all axioms of T . A TBox is consistent if it has a model. A TBox T entails an axiom α (T |= α) iff I |= T implies I |= α for each I.
In this paper we restrict ourselves to the case of data privacy with respect to retrieval queries. Since our ontology language includes nominals, we do not need to introduce individuals. Informally, the statement that an individual a belongs to a concept C can be expressed as {a} C. Therefore we will treat nominals as individuals and write j : C for j C when j ∈ I.
Definition 1 (Query, answer, view).
1.
A retrieval query is a concept C. 2. The answer to a query C with respect to a TBox T is the set of all nominals a ∈ I for which T |= a : C.
3.
A view definition is a finite set of queries. 4. A view V I of a view definition V is a finite set of axioms of the form a : C such that if a : C is an element of V I , then C ∈ V . 5. A view V I is possible with respect to a TBox T and a view definition V , if V I is a view of V and T ∪ V I is consistent.
In [1] we introduced the notion of provable data privacy. It turned out that for the setting we introduced above, provable data privacy can be reduced to entailment, see [2] . We make use of this fact here to give the following definition of data privacy.
Definition 2 (Data privacy).
1. Given a TBox T , a view V I , and a query C, we say that privacy is preserved for C with respect to T and V I if the set of answers to C with respect to T ∪ V I is empty. 2. Given a TBox T , a view definition V , and a query C, we say that privacy is preserved for C with respect to T and V if for all views V I that are possible with respect to T and V we have that privacy is preserved for C with respect to T and V I .
Locality based privacy
We prove a first privacy theorem based on the notion of locality which was first introduced in [4] in order to provide a logical framework for modular ontologies. A similar theorem for subsumption queries and SHIQ TBoxes is shown in [5] .
Definition 3 (Trivial expansion). An S-interpretation
, and X J = X I for every X ∈ S . A trivial expansion of I to S is an expansion J of I such that X J = ∅ for every role name and concept name X ∈ S \ S .
Definition 4 (Locality)
. Let S be a signature.
1. A concept A is positively local wrt. S if for every trivial expansion J of any S-interpretation to any S ⊇ S ∪ sig(A) we have A J = ∅. 2. An axiom α is local wrt. S if every trivial expansion J of any S-interpretation to any S ⊇ S ∪ sig(α) is a model of α.
Note that the definition of locality implies that an axiom containing a nominal j cannot be local wrt. S if j / ∈ S. Grau et al. [6] show how locality can be tested by standard DL reasoners. Although for SHOIQ this is a NEXPTIME-complete problem, the locality test will often perform well in practice. However, they also present a tractable approximation to the locality condition which is based on the syntactic structure of concepts.
In order to state our first privacy theorem we make the following assumptions. Let P and S be two signatures with P ⊆ S. Let T be a TBox over S and let T P ⊆ T be those axioms of T that are built from the signature P only. Further, we assume that all axioms of T \ T P are local wrt. P. Theorem 1. Let C be a positive local query wrt. P. Let V be a view definition which contains only queries over P. Then data privacy is preserved for C with respect to the TBox T and the view definition V .
Proof. Let V I be a possible view with respect to T and V .
Since V contains only concepts of P, we find that sig(V I ) \ P consists of nominals only. Therefore C is positively local wrt.
all axioms of T \ T P are local wrt. P ∪ sig(V I ).
Because of (1) there exists a P ∪ sig(V I )-interpretation I such that I |= T P and I |= V I . Let J be a trivial expansion of I to S ∪ sig(C). Thus by (3) and the definition of locality we immediately get for each α ∈ T \ T P that J |= α.
Therefore we have J |= T ∪ V I . Moreover, by (2) we find C J = ∅. Since V I was arbitrary, we conclude that privacy is preserved for C.
Partition based privacy
The assumption in the previous theorem that the view only consists of queries over P may be too restrictive in practice. In this section, we will present a privacy result that is based on partitioning an ontology T in a public part T P and a private (hidden) part T H . The public view definition V may now contain queries that access T H . However, this access will occur only via quantifiers and these quantifiers serve the purpose of information hiding. Therefore privacy will be preserved for positively local concepts of T H .
Definition 5 (Safe TBox). In [7] an algorithm is presented to generate modules from a safe ontology. We use this algorithm to produce a partitioning of a TBox T such that T = T P ∪ T H where T H and T P are disjoint. Moreover this algorithm gives a function V such that 1. V assigns to each concept A in sig(T ) either 1 or 2, and 2. V assigns to each role R in sig(T ) a pair (i, j) with i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
The semantic counterpart of the partitioning of a TBox is given by the following construction which is used in the proof of Theorem 3 in [7] . Let I = (∆ I , · I ) be1. if C is positively local, then C J = {x i : x ∈ C I }, 2. if C is not positively local, then C J = ∆ J j =i ∪ {x i : x ∈ C I }.
From this we immediately get the following theorem, again see [7] for a proof.
Theorem 2. Let T be a safe TBox and I be a model of T . Let J be the interpretation given above. Then J also is a model of T .
Next we introduce the notion of an open concept. We will then prove that privacy is preserved for positively local concepts C with V(C) = 2 with respect to the TBox T and any view definition which consists of open concepts only.
Definition 6. Let T , T P , T H , and V as above. The open concepts are inductively defined by the following clauses.
